Nearly five years after Myanmar’s military coup plunged the nation into chaos, Southeast Asia’s most prominent regional organization is teetering on the edge of irrelevance. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), once celebrated as a model for conflict avoidance and institutional resilience, now faces a crisis of its own making. Despite the staggering human toll—thousands dead, millions displaced, and a civil war with no end in sight—ASEAN remains paralyzed, either unwilling or structurally incapable of decisive action. But here’s where it gets controversial: this paralysis isn’t a flaw; it’s a feature. It’s the direct result of ASEAN’s foundational principles and the deeper political economy that sustains Southeast Asia’s regional order. Yet, as the crisis deepens, ASEAN’s credibility as the region’s central convening power hangs in the balance. Its failure to act risks transforming its centrality into utter irrelevance.
ASEAN’s paralysis: a clash of principle and power
The standard explanation for ASEAN’s inaction points to its core principles: non-interference, consensus-based decision-making, and a preference for dialogue over coercion. Known as the ‘ASEAN Way,’ these norms were crafted during the Cold War to shield fragile post-colonial states from superpower intervention and internal strife. They ensured sovereignty remained untouchable and regime security unquestioned. But what was once functional now acts as a straitjacket. These principles have morphed into tools for elite self-preservation rather than regional problem-solving. ASEAN’s structure reflects a silent pact among ruling classes: no member will challenge another’s domestic political order, lest they invite scrutiny of their own regimes. This mutual insurance policy explains why Myanmar’s junta—responsible for over 6,000 civilian deaths and 27,000 detentions since 2021, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP)—has faced little more than tepid statements of ‘deep concern’ and symbolic gestures like excluding generals from meetings. The Five-Point Consensus, adopted in April 2021 to halt violence and deliver aid, has been largely ignored by the junta. Yet, ASEAN has neither revised the framework nor imposed consequences for non-compliance. This persistence is a political strategy: it allows engagement without challenging the structural conditions that sustain military rule.
And this is the part most people miss: ASEAN’s paralysis isn’t about one state’s actions but the collective logic guiding all its members. Take Indonesia, for example. Under President Joko Widodo, Jakarta sought to restore ASEAN’s credibility through quiet diplomacy, prioritizing humanitarian access over confrontation. But this cautious pragmatism isn’t unique. Thailand, economically tied to Myanmar through energy projects, prioritizes border stability over political pressure. Singapore, while publicly condemning the coup, continues to provide a financial safe haven for military-linked entities, revealing the limits of normative commitment when pitted against economic interests. Malaysia, though more vocal on humanitarian issues, has avoided coordinated sanctions or regional enforcement mechanisms. Together, these approaches reflect ASEAN’s structural logic: a shared preference for engagement without consequence and stability over accountability. Each member state, in defending its own interests, reinforces a regional order that prioritizes sovereignty over solidarity.
The political economy of inaction
A deeper explanation for ASEAN’s inaction lies not just in its political norms but in its material interests. Myanmar’s economy, though weakened, remains intertwined with its neighbors. Thailand continues to import gas from Myanmar’s fields, a revenue stream that sustains the junta. Singapore hosts financial intermediaries linked to Myanmar’s military conglomerates, as highlighted by UN reports. Even Indonesia maintains significant trade ties, with bilateral trade reaching USD 1.1 billion in 2023. This material interdependence creates powerful disincentives for punitive measures, as sanctions or trade suspensions would disrupt regional supply chains and investment flows. This reflects a regional order where ruling elites prioritize capital mobility and regime stability over normative commitments. ASEAN’s reluctance to act isn’t just diplomatic caution—it’s a rational defense of the economic structures that sustain elite power.
Forces for change: external pressure and internal shifts
Despite this inertia, forces for change are emerging. Externally, ASEAN’s reputation as a credible regional actor is crumbling. Western and multilateral institutions increasingly bypass ASEAN, dealing directly with Myanmar’s resistance groups or focusing on humanitarian interventions through the UN and NGOs. This threatens ASEAN’s claim to centrality, the foundation of its diplomatic relevance in the Indo-Pacific. As centrality weakens, member states like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore may recalibrate their approach to preserve influence. For Indonesia, a weakened ASEAN risks diminishing its diplomatic weight in wider Indo-Pacific forums. Malaysia’s humanitarian stance signals a search for moral leadership, while Singapore views ASEAN’s credibility as essential for regional stability and investor confidence. Preserving centrality isn’t about embracing liberal values but safeguarding the material and reputational infrastructure that underpins each state’s external influence.
Internally, societal actors are reshaping the discourse. Transnational advocacy networks, human rights organizations, and diaspora communities are building cross-border solidarity that challenges state-centric narratives. These networks push ASEAN governments to engage directly with Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG) and consider alternative forms of legitimacy beyond the junta’s monopoly on power. While these movements lack institutional leverage, they exert discursive pressure that could gradually shift political possibilities.
From non-interference to non-indifference?
What might a more proactive ASEAN approach look like? The most likely scenario isn’t a dramatic break with foundational principles but a strategic reinterpretation. Non-interference could evolve into ‘non-indifference,’ allowing humanitarian action under the guise of collective security. Consensus might become more flexible, enabling ‘coalitions of the willing’ to act without full unanimity. Early signs of this adaptation are already visible: proposals for cross-border humanitarian corridors, limited engagement with Myanmar’s opposition, and discussions on targeted sanctions against military-linked businesses. Such measures wouldn’t transform ASEAN overnight but would mark a significant shift from ritualized inaction to sovereignty as stewardship. This evolution would signal a more pluralistic regional order, where state and non-state actors increasingly share governance space.
The stakes couldn’t be higher. If ASEAN continues to prioritize consensus over consequence, it risks geopolitical irrelevance. Major powers will bypass it, civil society will lose faith, and its claim to centrality will ring hollow. But if it evolves, transforming crisis management into crisis resolution, ASEAN could redefine its purpose for a contested Indo-Pacific era. Myanmar isn’t just a test of diplomatic agility—it’s a mirror reflecting Southeast Asian regionalism’s fundamental contradictions: sovereignty vs. responsibility, stability vs. justice, elite power vs. popular legitimacy. The crisis exposes the limitations of a 20th-century system struggling to meet 21st-century challenges. ASEAN’s future won’t be decided by declarations but by its ability to transcend paralysis and confront its contradictions. If it fails, it will remain a stage for empty rituals. If it adapts, it may emerge as a more mature, strategic, and legitimate actor—not by abandoning its principles but by reimagining them for a new regional order.
Here’s the thought-provoking question: Can ASEAN reinvent itself without sacrificing the very principles that define it? The answer will determine its relevance—or irrelevance—in the decades to come. Share your thoughts in the comments below.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent those of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Aniello Iannone is a lecturer in Indonesian and Southeast Asian Politics at the Department of Political Science and Government at Diponegoro University. His research focuses on the International Relations of Southeast Asia, Indonesian politics, comparative politics within Southeast Asia, and ASEAN’s role as a regional actor. Image credit: David MacSweeney.
